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Abstract.  This paper analyses the optimal combination of costly and costless messages that a 
Sender uses in a signaling game if he is able to choose among all equilibrium communication 
strategies.  We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium that maximizes the 
Sender’s ex ante expected utility in case of uniformly distributed types and quadratic loss 
functions.  First, the Sender often wants to avoid money burning by using the most 
informative cheap talk communication strategy.  Second, if he does burn money, he avoids 
separation and only re-arranges the existing intervals of the most informative cheap talk 
equilibrium, possibly adding one extra interval.  Money burning takes place in the second 
interval only. 
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1. Introduction 
Communication in signaling games can take place through costly and costless signals.  
Crawford and Sobel (1982) present what has become the canonical model of communication 
through costless signals - cheap talk - between a sender who is privately informed about the 
state and an uninformed receiver who has to take an action that affects the utility of both 
players.1  They show that cheap talk can be informative as long as the degree to which the 
preferences of the two players concerning the best action in a given state do not differ too 
much.  Although informative, communication will necessarily be vague in the sense that the 
Sender adds noise to his messages: equilibrium communication strategies partition the 
(single-dimensional) type space in intervals, and the Sender only reports in which element of 
the partition his type lies. 
Costly signals were first studied in their extreme form of completely dissipative signals - 
money burning - by Spence (1973).  In the context of labor market signaling, he shows how 
high ability job applicants could separate themselves from low ability ones by showing 
credentials that are costly to obtain but otherwise useless.  This precision of communication 
through money burning contrasts with the vagueness of communication based on cheap talk. 
In practice, communication often relies on a combination of cheap talk and costly signals 
(dissipative or not).  This situation is studied by Austen-Smith and Banks (1998, 2000).  They 
show that the option to burn money expands the set of equilibria enormously, and can 
increase the precision of cheap talk communication.2  In this paper, we follow the same 
approach by allowing the Sender to use both cheap talk and money burning, and characterize 
all possible equilibrium communication strategies.  Our main contribution is the derivation of 
                                                                          
1  See also Green and Stokey (2007) for an earlier and an alternative formulation. 
2  Austen-Smith and Banks (1998) study some welfare results for the uniform-quadratic case.  Kartik 
(2007) shows that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential 
without money burning. 
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the optimal Sender’s equilibrium, i.e., the communication strategy that maximizes the 
Sender’s expected utility ex ante, before knowing his type. 
We study this optimal Sender’s equilibrium for the following reasons.  First, from a 
theoretical point of view it is interesting to know the optimal mixture of costly and costless 
signals from the Sender’s prospective.  Since it is up to the Sender whether he uses costly 
signaling in addition to cheap talk, we want to know whether he wants to use money burning 
or not and, if yes, to which extent. 
Second, this is a natural focal point for the Sender if he can choose an equilibrium.  This 
focal point is plausible because the Sender is the first mover in the signaling game and, 
therefore, might have an advantage to announce which equilibrium he will be playing.  
Finally, the optimal Sender’s equilibrium might have nice evolutionary stability properties, as 
the recent work of Demichelis and Weibull (2008) demonstrates. 
In the main part of the paper, we augment the much-used uniform-quadratic variant of 
the Crawford and Sobel (1982) cheap talk model with costly signaling (money burning).  In 
this model, the Sender's type is uniformly distributed, and the players' preferences are 
represented by quadratic loss functions. 
We find that the optimal equilibrium is similar to the most informative equilibrium of 
Crawford and Sobel (1982).  Depending on the preference misalignment parameter of the 
model, the Sender either burns money or not.  In particular, if the degree of misalignment 
exceeds a threshold value, the latter case realizes and the optimal equilibrium is just the most 
informative pure cheap talk equilibrium.  In this case, burning money does not allow the 
Sender to improve his pay-off because it is too costly. 
Only when the preference misalignment parameter is smaller than the threshold value, 
and satisfies some restrictions, does money burning occur in equilibrium.  Nevertheless, the 
Sender never uses it to separate the types perfectly.  The optimal equilibrium is again a 
partition equilibrium very similar to the most informative pure cheap talk equilibrium. 
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The Sender uses money burning in two ways.  First, he may increase the number of 
intervals in the equilibrium partition.  In this case, the optimal equilibrium is obtained from 
the most informative cheap talk equilibrium by squeezing the existing partition and inserting 
an extra interval in between the first and the second ones.  All types from the new (second) 
interval pool together, send identical message, and burn the same amount of money; no other 
types use costly signaling.  Although he burns a positive amount of money, the Sender’s 
expected utility increases because the resulting partition becomes finer. 
Second, even when having more intervals is not optimal (too costly), the Sender burns 
money in order to adjust the sizes of the existing intervals to his benefit.  In this case, the 
optimal equilibrium is obtained from the most informative cheap talk equilibrium by 
squeezing the second and stretching all the other intervals.  All types from the second interval 
pool together, send identical message, and burn a positive amount of money.  The expected 
utility of the sender increases because intervals in the resulting partition become more even. 
As to the values of the misalignment parameter for which the Sender burns money in the 
optimal equilibrium, we show that money burning can occur only when the degree of 
misalignment between Sender's and Receiver's preferences is such that the corresponding 
cheap-talk equilibrium has at least three intervals.  Moreover, money burning is only used 
when the value of the misalignment parameter is close to a value at which the maximum 
number of intervals changes in a pure cheap talk game.  When the misalignment gradually 
and continuously vanishes, optimal equilibria with and without money burning form an 
infinitely alternating pattern and the Sender’s ex-ante probability of sending a costly signal 
converges to zero. 
We conclude our analysis by studying general specifications of the type distribution and 
objective function of the Sender.  We derive a sufficient condition under which the separation 
of types is not optimal.  We also show that for any distribution and any objective function, 
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there will be a type for which this condition holds.  Consequently, perfectly separating 
equilibria are never optimal. 
Recently, De Haan et al (2011) have studied how subjects in a laboratory experiment use 
cheap talk and money burning in the uniform-quadratic case for various degrees of preference 
misalignment.  It is unlikely that any lab experiment will be able to mimic the precise 
alternating pattern of the presence and absence of money burning as a function of the 
misalignment parameter that we have shown to be the best from the Sender’s perspective.  
They do find, however, that Senders have a strong preference for cheap talk, and that only 
when interests start to grow more misaligned do Senders turn to money burning.  They also 
find, again in line with our theoretical observations, that Senders do not burn money to 
support intervals of full separation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up the original signaling 
model and derives all its WPBE.  Section 3 derives the Sender’s optimal equilibrium.  Section 
4 generalizes some of the results to general types’ distributions and Senders’ utility functions, 
Section 5 concludes, and Appendix contains all the proofs. 
2. Signaling Game 
In the main part of the analysis, we use a uniform-quadratic version of the signaling game 
from Austen-Smith and Banks (2000).  The main reason to start the analysis in this way is the 
fact that this version of the pure cheap talk game has been used extensively in applied work 
on communication.  It is therefore particularly important to understand how this version 
behaves when one adds money burning.  Section 4 generalizes some of the results to general 
types’ distributions and Senders’ utility functions. 
There are two players, a Sender S and a Receiver R.  The type t of the Sender is his 
private information and is uniformly distributed over the type space  .  Having observed 
 the Sender sends the Receiver a costless message 
1,0
t Mm  from any continuum space M, and 
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publicly burns an amount of money .  Let 0b    M1,0:  be the pure signaling 
strategy of S,     tbtm ,  , and let set  ,sT  be the pre-image of  under s  : it is a set of 
types that, by following the strategy  t , send signal    Mbms , : 
      t sts   ,01s  :1,T . 
Having observed signal  bms  , , the Receiver forms his posterior beliefs about the 
type of the Sender, which we denote by the CDF    ztszG  Pr .  Then, the Receiver takes 
an action .  Let a M:  be his pure strategy,  s  t  s a .  By   we refer 
to the action induced by type t . 
As is usual in cheap talk signaling games, the model is characterized by an enormous 
multiplicity of equilibria.  That is why we consider classes of WPBE such that all equilibria 
which generate the same induced action function     sta   belong to the same class.  We 
refer to the whole class of these equilibria as to equilibrium. 
Preferences of the Sender and the Receiver are given by the following utility functions 
 and  respectively: SU RU
     ax  2 bt bmtaU S ,,,
  
staU S ,, , 
and 
   2aR ,,, bmtaUs R ,, taU  t , 
where  is the parameter indicating the extent to which the players’ preferences over 
-pairs differ.  Players’ ex-ante expected utilities from a strategy profile 
0x
 ta,    ,  are given 
by: 
              tbE2tattV S ,,  xtEtUE S ,
   
, (1) 
        2R ,,, tttV  R tUE  at E . (2) 
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The definition of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE)      stGst ,,  is 
standard and requires (i)  t  to be optimal given  s ,  s  to be optimal given  stG , and 
for  where  (on equilibrium path) s   0Pr s  stG  to be consistent with  t . 
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) show that all equilibria of the model are essentially 
partition equilibria where the type space is a disjoint union of the set of pooling types P  with 
the set of separating types , i.e.,  S   PS1,0 , PS .  The set  consists of all types 
that send individual messages, which we assume to be 
S
  tm* “my type is t”, 
burn distinct amounts of money  tbS , and elicit distinct actions.  To the contrary, the set  is 
the union of mutually disjoint pooling intervals.  By neglecting marginal types, which 
measure is zero, we index the pooling intervals by a subscript 
P
Ii , where the size of the 
index set  is at most countable infinity, and write them as I  iB, ,iA  .  We denote the 
set of such pooling intervals by 
ii BA 
  IA  iBA ii , .  For any pooling interval   ABA, , all 
types t  send identical messages, which we assume to be A, B
  BAm ,* “my type is an element of  BA, ”, 
burn identical amounts of money , and elicit identical actions.  Since  uniquely 
determines the sets  and  by 
P
ib A
P S    AP  ii B ii BA, , A  and   PS \1,0 , we also refer to  as 
to equilibrium partition. 
A
In order to deal with strategies that have infinitely many pooling intervals we consider 
them as a limit of a strategy with finite number N  of intervals when N  unboundedly 
increases.  For finite N , any partition A  can be written as follows: 
  NiBA ii ,,1, A , 10 110   Niii AABAB , Ni ,,1 , (3) 
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where types  pool together and types  ii BAt ,   1,  ii ABt  separate.  If 0N  then 
, , and , i.e., all types separate.  We use  A 1 S1A  1,0   NΠ  to denote the set of all 
partitions  with up to  intervals.  Finally, we denote the amount of money burned by 
pooling types  by , and by separating types 
A N
tb ii BAt ,   Pib  1, iAiBt  by    tbt Sb . 
According to Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) in any WPBE of the signaling game, the 
Sender partitions the type-space according to a finite partition  NΠΑ  or to a limit thereof 
when  increases unboundedly.  It turns out that the reverse is also true, i.e., for any partition 
 there exists a corresponding WPBE.  In order to characterize all such equilibria, 
we define a function : 
N
NΠ Α
Pc
      cABxABcBAcP  4/,, 2 . (4) 
The following proposition provides the equilibrium characterization result. 
Proposition 1.  For any partition  NΠΑ , there exist a money burning parameter c  and an 
off equilibrium path action  1,0  such that the tuple OFF OFFc ,  defines a (class of) 
WPBE   of the game where: 
,Α
a) For any Ni ,,1 , a type   ii BAt ,  burns   0,,  cBAcb iiPPi  and sends message 
 ii BA .  Having observed the signal m ,*   Piii bBAms ,,* , the Receiver sets 
 2/i  s  i BA .  Type t Sender gets utility   cxtxtu  22  i . i AttB 
b) For any N , a type i ,,1  1,  ii ABt  burns   02  cxttbS  and sends messages 
 tm* .  Having observed the signal     tbt S, , the Receiver sets   ts ms  *  .  Type t 
Sender gets utility  .  t  cxtx  22u
c) Having observed any off equilibrium path signal OFFs , the Receiver sets   OFFOFFs   . 
d) Players get ex-ante expected utilities: 
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   


N
i
ii ABxxcV
1
32S
6
1  and     N
i
ii ABV
3R
12
1 
Α
  0,,  cBAcb iiPPi
  02  cxttbS
 (5) 
e) Every WPBE of the signaling game allows for such a representation. 
Parameter  in a WPBE is an additive constant to the amounts of money that all types burn.  
For a given partition , its value is not necessarily unique.  On the one hand, it cannot be too 
small as types cannot burn negative amounts, i.e.,  and 
.  This defines the lower bound 
c
  Α
0
c  as the lowest value of  for which all 
 and , and at least one type burns no money.  On the other hand,  cannot be 
too large either as otherwise no off equilibrium path beliefs support this WPBE.  This defines 
the upper bound 
c
c0Pib   tSb
 Αc  as the highest value of  for which this WPBE still exists.  The 
following example demonstrates the general structure of an equilibrium and its multiplicity. 
c
Example 1.  Suppose 15.0x  and consider partition     1,3.0,2.0,0Α .  One can check 
that for any  ,  ccc  0,02.0  and off equilibrium path actions OFF [ cx  0225.0,0 ],  
OFFc ,  defines a WPBE such that types ,Α  2.0,0t  pool, types  3.0,2.0  separate, 
and types  1,3.0  pool. 
t
t
In Figure 1, we have drawn the equilibrium money burning function  (dotted bold 
line) and the Sender’s utility (drawn bold line), in case of 
 tb
02.0 cc .  Types  2.0,0t  
burn no money, types  burn  3.0,2.0t    02.03.0  ttbS , and types  burn 
.  This is the lowest value of the parameter c  for which WPBE exists: for 
 1,3.0t
  0525.03 tbP cc   
types  would need to burn a negative amount of money, which is not feasible.  This 
equilibrium is unique up to off equilibrium path actions: any  supports this 
WPBE. 
 2.0,0t 
 1.0, 0OFF
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Figure 1 also depicts a second equilibrium money burning function and concomitant 
Sender’s utility for 0 cc  (thin lines).  In this case, types  2.0,0t  burn , 
types  burn , and types 
  02.01 tbP
 3.0,2.0t    ttbS 3.0  1,3.0t  burn   .03 tbP
0
0725.  The only off 
equilibrium path action that supports this equilibrium is .  The value OFF 0 cc  is the 
highest value of the parameter c  for which WPBE exists: for cc   no off equilibrium path 
action can support this strategy profile. 
Ex-ante equilibrium utilities (5) represent players’ preferences over the set of all WPBE.  
In particular, for a given partition  NΠΑ , the Sender prefers an equilibrium with a lower 
value of c  whereas the Receiver is indifferent.  Hence, WPBE   OFFc ,, ΑΑ  Pareto 
dominates any other WPBE ,,cΑ  with  Αcc  . 
3. Sender’s Optimal Equilibrium 
We denote Sender’s optimal equilibrium by S .  According to Proposition 1, if 
OFFSSS c ,,Α  exists it is either a solution to the following optimization problem: 
   



1
0
32S
, 6
1max
N
i
iic
ABxxcV
Α
 
   tbtu  ,
t
Pool Pool Separate 
OFFc ,,Α
OFFc ,,Α
 
Figure 1.  Two equilibrium outcomes for    1,3.0,2.0,0Α 15.0x and . 
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subject to 
 
     
  





 02
04/,,
1
2
iii
iiiiii
P
BAcxB
cABxABcBAc
NΠΑ
 
for finite , or it is the limit thereof when the number of pooling intervals  unboundedly 
increases.  The first inequality 
N N
  0,, cBAc iiP  requires that the pooling types  burn 
non-negative amounts of money.  The second inequality requires that if there is a positive 
measure of the separating types 
 ii BA , t
 1,  ii ABt  so that   01  ii BA , each of them burns non-
negative amount   2  xttbS 0c , which can only be binding when . iBt 
It is easy to note the trade-off of the Sender.  On the one hand, he benefits from having 
fewer and longer pooling intervals in  thereby increasing the sum in the objective.  On the 
other hand, this requires a larger value of c  to maintain the inequality  which 
is costly as it directly decrease the value of . 
Α
  0,, cBAc iiP
SV
We prove the existence and derive S  in several steps by showing which WPBE are 
certainly non-optimal for the Sender.  Here is the first restriction. 
Lemma 1.  If the measure of types that separate in WPBE   is positive, i.e., if 1 ii AB , 
then   is not optimal. 
According to Lemma 1, it is never in the interest of S to reveal his type perfectly by burning 
money.  The reason is that it is too costly for the marginal types: they are strictly better-off by 
pooling themselves.  Thus, if  does exist it must only contain pooling intervals so that 
 for all i .  Using this result, we rewrite the optimization problem of S as 
follows: 
S
1 ii AB N,,1
  


 
1
0
3
1
2S
, 6
1max
N
i
iic
AAxxcV
Α
  subject to (6) 
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    04/211   cAAxAA iiii , and 10 111   Nii AAAA   (7) 
The second restriction is on the number of pooling intervals . N
Lemma 2.  For any 0x  there exists a number   1xN  such that if WPBE   has 
 xN  intervals, then   is not optimal. N 
According to Lemma 2, it is never in the interest of the Sender to have infinitely many 
pooling intervals.  The reason is very similar to that of Lemma 1.  Indeed, in a partition with 
infinitely many intervals, some (in fact, infinitely many) of them must be of an arbitrary small 
length and the same logic applies: it is cheaper for the Sender to pool some of these short 
intervals into a bigger one.  Using this result, we only need to consider finite partitions. 
The next restriction is on the number of the pooling intervals where the Sender burns 
money. 
Lemma 3.  If in WPBE  , the Sender burns money in more than one interval, then   is not 
optimal. 
According to Lemma 3, if the Sender finds money burning attractive he chooses only one 
pooling interval where he burns.  The reason for this result is the convexity of the objective 
function with respect to marginal types .  When money is burned in two or more intervals, 
the number of binding restrictions  in the optimization problem is smaller than the 
number of independent variables .  Therefore, small deviations in at least one of them 
violates neither of the equilibrium conditions.  However, due to the convexity of the objective 
function, the maximum cannot be achieved at an interior point, which implies that one 
additional restriction become binding.  Only when all c , except for possibly one, all  
are fully determined by the value of c , and the maximum only occurs at the corner. 
iA
P
ic
0Pi iA
0
iA
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This result suggests that if  exists, its structure is very similar to the pure cheap talk 
equilibria in Crawford and Sobel (1982).  The next restriction is on the position of the interval 
where S burns money in equilibrium partition. 
S
Lemma 4.  If in WPBE  , the Sender burns money in the interval which is not the second 
interval  32 , AA , then   is not optimal. t
According to Lemma 4, if the Sender burns money in S , she only burns it in the second 
interval.  The reason why burning money in the first interval  2,0 At  is suboptimal is that 
the objective function V  is strictly monotone in  and, hence, there is another equilibrium S 2A
~  that dominates  .  On the other hand, burning money in any interval k , , is 
suboptimal because there is another equilibrium 
2k
~  in which S burns in the previous interval 
 and which also dominates  . 1k
SOne important consequence of Lemma 4 is that   exists.  Indeed, the choice of 
 by means of  1,02 A  (7) uniquely defines a value of  2Ac c  by    0,,0 221  AcAcc PP
 3,,0
, 
and then, since , it defines values of  for 11 NA iN A  Ni 
2A
 by 
.  Therefore, the objective function   0, 2 Ac , 1 A iNiN

 Acc PPi (6) is continuous in  and 
attains its global maximum at . S
It turns out that the structure of S  is closely related to the structure of a particular 
equilibrium if the Sender can only use cheap talk.  For every  3,2,1N , we define  as Nx
 12
1
 NNxN . (8) 
Without the option to burn money, if the degree of misalignment x  satisfies , 
for every value of  there exists an equilibrium in which the Sender uses  
messages, see Crawford and Sobel (1982).  For every 
 NN xxx ,1
n Nn ,,1 
x , the equilibrium with the highest 
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number of messages, which we denote by , is called the most informative equilibrium, 
and we denote it by 
CTN
CT : 
   NCT xxN  max xN : . 
Thus, the equilibrium conditions put an upper bound on the number of messages that the 
Sender can use.  The Sender prefers an equilibrium with the largest number of messages for a 
given value of x . 
Intuitively, the introduction of an additional instrument to communicate – money burning 
– can be used to alleviate this bound.  This is particularly cost-effective for those values of x  
for which a slight reduction in x  would already have led to an increase in the number of 
messages in the absence of money burning.  The equilibrium conditions also determine the 
exact positioning of the intervals of CT .  Hence, although it may not be optimal to use 
money burning to increase the number of messages, it can be used to change the lengths of the 
intervals.  This is particularly beneficial for values of x  for which an additional message has 
just emerged, and the lengths of the intervals are unequal.  These intuitions are borne out by 
the next proposition. 
Proposition 2.  For every 4N  there exist 
N
y  and Ny  satisfying 
NNN
yyx   11 NN yx  , such that: 
a) If  NN yxx ,  so that 1 N , then N  and 02 Pc , i.e., the 
Sender’s optimal equilibrium strategy has one more interval than the most informative 
cheap talk equilibrium strategy, and money is burned in the second interval. 
N CT NN CTS  1
b) If x ( NN xy , ] so that N , then NCT   and 02 Pc , i.e., the Sender’s 
optimal equilibrium strategy has the same number of intervals as the most informative 
cheap talk equilibrium strategy, and money is burned in the second interval. 
N CT  NN S
 can be taken to be   10Pr  OFFstS  and 0OFF . c) Off equilibrium path beliefs in 
 14
00.1
0.2
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0
0.01
0.02
   0Pr tb
Pb2
P or position 2 essentially says that the introduction of money burning raises the Sender’s 
expected utility if x  is close to x  and if the most informative cheap talk equilibrium allows 
Figure 2 illustrates how, 
N
for at least three dis ct messages ( 4N ). tin
for different values of x , money burning is present or absent 
rnating pattern.  It shows the ex ante probability 
 (thick line, left scale), which is the length of the second 
from the optimal equilibrium  in an alte
that money is burned 
 S
 0
l on 
 Pr tb
ainterval 23 AA   condition    0t , and the amount of money burned b2  in the second 
interval of ple, at 
b P
 S , and (thin line, right scale).  Note that, for exam 22/14 x , the  y
length of this interval is zero, and increases with fu ctions in rther redu x .  At 039.0
4
 yx , 
ount of monethe Sender burns money for nearly 20% of the possible values of t .  he am y 
2
T
burned tly poPb  is stric sitive at 4yx  , and decreas  fues with rther reductions in x .  This is so 
because equations 2A , 3A   0,2 cA,01  cPc P  and  c,3AAcP ,2cP2  yield at 4yx  : 
   0Pr tb
Pb2
4x
x
4y4y5x 5y5y  
Figure 2.  The amount of money burned, , and the ex ante probability that it is positive, Pb2
   0Pr tb , as functions of x . 
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01 2  AxAbP . 
Money burning cannot improve upon the most inform lk e
4 222

ative cheap ta quilibrium for 
22/14  yx  (see the remark after the proof of the proposition in Appendix).  That is, for 
mon
should be alig
Irrespective of whether the Sender’s strategy space is limited to cheap talk or also 
ey burning to improve the Sender’s utility, the interests between Sender and Receiver 
ned sufficiently well such that unaided cheap talk communication allows for at 
least three messages. 
includes money burning, a decrease in x  eventually gives rise to the emergence of an 
additional interval (m
 the S
new intervals emerge as the first interval at 
essage).  There is, however, an interesting difference in the location of 
the newly emerged additional interval.  If ender only has cheap talk at his disposition, 
0t .  If, in addition, the Sender also has some 
money to burn, new intervals appear as a second interval. 
As an illustration, Figure 3 shows the equilibrium partitions, A  and A  for 042.0CT S x  
in the absence and the presence of money burning as a possible in estrum nt of communication, 
respectively.  Since  44 , yxx , the most informative cheap talk equilibrium    
intervals (with up to three digits of accuracy): 
 
 CT has three
    1,499.0,99165.0,0CTA , 
whereas the optimal equilibrium S  has four i
4.0,165.0,
ntervals: 
        1,504.0,504.0,176.0,176.0,066.0,066.0,0SA . 
 
t
14A01 A 2A 3A 
4A01 A 2A 3A 15 A
t
CTA
SA
CTA SA 042.0
 
Figure 3.  Equilibrium partitions  and  for x . 
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It shows how the additional interval appears at 2A . 
Figure 4 further shows, for 042.0x , ex-post equilibrium utility functions  tu
: the Sender burns 
 of the 
bu ing function Sender in CT  and S , and the money rn  tb
s 
-3105.5   in the second inte S .  In this way, the expected amount of money 
burned   -4232 100.6  AAbE P  generates a gros utility gain of 
-4102.7 CT .  This type of ilibrium improvement is always possible as long 
as 
2 Pb
 S bEV
rval of A
e
 b
V

qu
 xx
04.0 , shows how money burning is used to raise the Sender’s 
util
1N . 1,N y
Figure 5, drawn for 
ity by leaving the n  interva
x
umber of ls unaffected, but changing their position.  Since 
 44 , xy , the most inform cheap talk equilibrium CTx ative   has four intervals: 
CT
t
   tbtu  ,
 tb
S
 
Figure 4.  Equilibria CT  and S  for 042.0x
 
. 
t
1A
4A1A 2A 3A 15 A
t
CTA
SA
2A 3A 4A 15 A
 
Figure 5.  Equilibrium partitions  and  for . CTA SA 04.0x
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        1,51.0,51.0,18.0,18.0,01.0,1.0,0CTA , 
s the optimal equilibrium Sand so doe  : 
        1,0,512.0,185.0,185.0,035.0,035.0,0SA 512. . 
ex-post equilibrium utility functions  of the Sender 
in  and , and the m unction 
Figure 6 further shows, for 04.0x ,  tu
CT S oney burning f  tb : the Sender burns  in -3102.0 
104.3 CT
2
Pb
V
the second interval of A  this way, the expected amount of money burned 
   -4232 101.3 AbbE P  generates a gross utility gain of   -4S bEV .  
This type of equilibrium im vement is always possible as long as 
S .  In
pro
   A
x ( NN xy , ]. 
es, it is not immediately clear how eff n 
raising the Sender’s expected utility.  Figure 7 plots (left scale, thick e) lati
From the previous figur
in ut
ective money burning is i
 lin  the re ve increase 
ility,   CTCTS VVV /  as a function of x.  As one can see, the relative increase in utility is 
small and attains its maximum of 1.26% at 025.0x .  Another way of measuring the 
effectivene burning is by comparing the expected net utility gain with the 
expected costs of money burning.  The thin lin ts the money burning 
effectiveness measured by 
ss of money 
e (right scale) represen
    CTS tbEVV / .  It can be seen that for smaller values of x , 
money burning becomes increasingly effective in the sense that the potential utility gain from 
CT
t
   tbtu  ,  tb
S
 
Figure 6.  Equilibria CT  and S  for 04.0x . 
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money burning is much larger in absolute terms than the expected budget which is necessary 
to achieve this gain. 
4. Generalizations of the Uniform-Quadratic Model 
So far, we have studied in deta uch used in 
applied work, and the results we ob
il the uniform-quadratic model.  This model is m
tained are therefore interesting by themselves.  It is also 
clear that the derivations of the optimal Sender’s equilibrium depend on the analytical form of 
the type distribution and on the Sender’s utility function.  Let us suppose now that the 
Senders’ types are distributed over the type space  1,0  in accordance with a distribution 
function  tF , which has a strictly positive and continuously differentiable density function 
   tFtf   on  1,0   Suppose also that the Sender’s utility function SU  is given by: 
       batWbmtaUaU  ,,,,SS , st,,
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
0
0.01
0.02
 
x
CT
CTS
V
VV   
CT
CTS
V
VV 
tbE
VV CTS 
  tbE
VV CTS 
 
Figure 7.  Relative utility gain   CTCTS VVV / , and the money burning effectiveness 
    tbEVV CTS / , as functions of x . 
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where, in addition to the assumptions in Crawford and Sobel (1982),3 its third-order partial 
derivatives , and  are continuous functions on  atWtta ,   atWtaa ,  21,0 .4 
Our first result is the condition on  atW ,  and  tF  under which Lemma 1 generalizes, 
and the perfect separation of types is not optimal.  We define a function  as follows:  t
      ttW
ttWttWt
ta
taatta
,2
,,2  . 
Proposition 3. Let a WPBE   have an interval of separating types  .  If the 
following condition holds for some 
   Α1, ii AB
 1,  ii ABt : 
F
f
f
f
F
f
f
f


1
, (9) 
then  is strictly suboptimal.  If this condition holds for all   1,0t , only semi-pooling 
equilibria can be optimal. 
Proposition 3 is a variant of Lemma 1 for the generalization of the model.  It can be 
interpreted as follows.  Suppose types  1,  ii AB 
1iA
    Α1iA
t  separate in equilibrium .  Pooling the 
types from the marginal neighborhood of  will require, in general, that all types either 
above or below  will need to burn extra marginal amount of money.  The two inequalities 
of condition 
1iA
(9) guarantee that at least one of those possibilities leads to a marginal increase 
of the Sender’s ex-ante utility.  When condition (9) holds for all types, any equilibrium with 
separating types  is strictly suboptimal. ,iB
Using Proposition 3, we can extend the validity of the results obtained in Section 3 for 
other model specifications.  It is easy to see that   0 t  in the uniform-quadratic model.  By 
                                                                          
  0,3  These are ataa   0, attaW  and W  on  21,0 . 
4  A generalization of the receiver utility function sta ,,R
 sta ,,R
U  is straightforward and does not change the 
current analysis provided U  satisfies some mild regularity assumptions similar to those of 
Crawford and Sobel (1982). 
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our assumptions on  and  atW ,   tF , condition (9) will be satisfied in some open 
neighborhood of the uniform-quadratic model in  space, i.e., the space of three times 
continuously differentiable functions with the supremum norm 
3C
   3,,0 supn nff .  
Taking into account that in the proofs of Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Lemma 4, and Proposition 2, 
the conclusions have been made based on strict inequalities, they can be naturally generalized. 
Corollary of Proposition 3.  There exists a 0  such that for all  atW ,  and  tF  
satisfying         t , Lemmas 1-4 hold, the optimal Sender’s 
equilibrium exists, is unique, and is characterized by 
 tFaatW ,,max 2 xt
S
Proposition 2. 
According to this result,  from Proposition 2 qualitatively remains the same for all 
functional forms provided the distribution  tF
a
 is close in the norm to the uniform 
distribution and the utility  is close to the quadratic form.  ,tW
One can observe that at least one of the inequalities of condition (9) holds when  
converges to zero and to one.  Our last result exploits this property. 
t
Proposition 4.  There always exists a  1,0t  such that condition (9) holds, i.e., a perfectly 
separating equilibrium is not optimal for the Sender. 
Proposition 4 implies that the Sender never wants to use money burning to reveal his type 
perfectly, for any distribution of types and loss function. 
5. Discussion 
Above, we have derived the optimal equilibrium from the Sender’s perspective.  It is not hard 
to see that the equilibrium that maximizes the Receiver’s ex-ante expected utility is quite 
different in nature.  Indeed, as the Receiver does not incur the cost of money burning, the 
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Receiver’s optimal equilibrium is characterized by complete separation through money 
burning by the Sender.  An interesting question then becomes what equilibrium signaling 
strategy is best from a social welfare perspective.  We focus again on the uniform-quadratic 
case.  Let   denote the efficient equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium that maximizes the social 
welfare function V : 
SW
 SW
         N
i
ii ABxxcVVV
32RSSW
12
1 . 
A comparison with the objective function of the Sender (5) shows that the efficient 
equilibrium  is qualitatively the same as SW S .  All results from Section 3 continue to hold 
qualitatively for this new objective function, although the exact locations of marginal types in 
the efficient equilibrium will be different from that of the optimal Sender’s equilibrium.  
Thus, the practical role of money burning in improving social welfare is very limited as well. 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) have characterized the Sender’s optimal equilibrium if the 
Sender can use cheap talk only.  In Section 3, we have derived the optimal equilibrium when 
he can also use money burning.  We now discuss the Sender’s optimal equilibrium if his only 
means of communication is money burning.  Consider any equilibrium signaling strategy that 
involves cheap talk and possibly money burning, and consider the equilibrium partition it 
induces.  Rather than using various cheap talk messages, the Sender can burn various amounts 
of money.  The equilibrium partition can be approximated arbitrarily closely by making the 
amounts of money burned vanishingly small (but still different one from the other). As a 
result, the loss in expected utility due to the absence of cheap talk can be made arbitrarily 
small.  Consequently, the optimal equilibrium in case of money burning only does not exist; 
but the supremum of the ex-ante expected utility of the Sender in the absence of cheap talk 
equals his ex-ante expected utility in case of the optimal equilibrium characterized in Section 
3. 
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Besides the reasons stated in the Introduction, there is another reason why it is interesting 
to derive the Sender’s equilibrium signaling strategy that maximizes his ex-ante expected 
utility.  In a companion paper (Karamychev and Visser, 2011) we show that an announcement 
by the Sender, before observing his type, that he will play the optimal equilibrium signaling 
strategy is credible.  The notion of credibility that we use is essentially that of Farrell and 
Rabin (1996) – a statement is credible if it is both self-signaling and self-committing.  As the 
Sender is the first to move in the game, he may also have an advantage in announcing which 
equilibrium strategy he intends to play.  There is, however, no reason to believe that being the 
first to move in the game necessarily means that the informed player determines how his 
signals should be interpreted.  For example, even though it is a student who takes costly 
actions and makes cheap talk statements about his abilities, she may be living in a society in 
which potential employers decide how such actions and statements are interpreted. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study a Sender who can signal his private information by using both cheap 
talk messages and money burning.  Money burning significantly changes the set of possible 
outcomes of the signaling game.  Any partition of the type space can be made an equilibrium 
by properly choosing amounts of money that different types burn.  However, these equilibria 
are not equally likely to occur since the Sender has non-trivial preferences over them.  In this 
paper, we have derived the optimal Sender’s equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium that the Sender 
prefers the most.  This equilibrium is very similar to the most informative cheap talk 
equilibrium, and may differ from it in two respects.  First, an extra interval may be injected in 
between the first and the second interval, and the second, in the resulting second interval the 
Sender burns money to adjust the lengths of all intervals in the equilibrium partition. 
We have also analyzed some asymptotical properties of this equilibrium when the 
misalignment between preferences of the Sender and Receiver disappears.  In this case, 
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money burning is used in smaller amounts, less often, but with unboundedly increasing 
effectiveness. 
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Appendix 
Analytical routines, long algebra transformations, and numerical computations are omitted 
and available upon request. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Let us fix  and a finite partition N  NΠΑ .  First we derive all the necessary conditions 
that a WPBE with partition  has to satisfy.  This gives us the strategy profile Α   , .  Then, 
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we show that it is always possible to satisfy these conditions by choosing parameters c  and 
 properly. OFF
We begin with the Receiver.  Having observed a signal  (on and off equilibrium), R 
believes that 
s
  1,Pr  st T .  Then, his equilibrium strategy must be: 
               ,s,maxarg,,maxarg 2R ttEstatEsttaUEs
aa
TTT  . 
By the definition of  Α (3), all types  ii BAt ,  send messages  in equilibrium, 
burn , and induce the same action 
 ii BAm ,* 
P
ib        2/iB, iii ABAttEta  .  Hence, if type  
sends a signal 
t
 y  as if his type were  ii BAy , , he gets the following pooling utility: 
, for  ii BAy , . (10)           PiiiP bBAxtytyaUyt  2S 2/,,, u
Similarly, all types  send individual messages  1,  ii ABt   tm* , burn , and induce 
actions 
 tbS
    tttEta  .  Hence, if type t  sends a signal  y  as if his type were 
, he gets the following utility:  1, ii A  By
          ybyxtytyaUyt SS  2S ,,, u . 
In equilibrium, each type  must find it optimal to signal his true type.  Hence, it 
maximizes  with respect to 
 1,  ii ABt 
 ytu , y , and the truth telling condition requires that the 
maximum occurs at ty 
ib
.  This yields the first-order condition  which 
solution is , where  is an unknown constant.  Thus, if type t  sends a signal 
   tbx S  20
 S tb  2 S Sibxt
 y  with , its separating utility is  iAy , iB
, for  1,  ii ABy . (11)          SiS bxyyxtytyaUyt  2,,, 2S u
Combining (10) and (11) we write utility of type t  when its signal is  y  as follows: 
        



1
2
2
,,2
,,2/,
ii
S
i
ii
P
iii
AByifbxyyxt
BAyifbBAxtytu   (12) 
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Each type  maximizes  with respect to  1,0t   ytu , y .  Hence, the equilibrium utility  tu  
can be written as follows: 
 
 
   ttuytutu
y
,,max
1,0


  . 
Thus,  is the upper envelope of  tu  ytu ,  and, therefore, is continuous in  at all intervals’ 
boundaries  and .  This allows us to relate , , , and  in the indifference 
equations  and 
t
iA
i
P A ,
t
u
iBt 
 iS Au ,
P
ib
S
ib iA iB
  ii AA      iBiB ,Si uB, iP Bu , which leads to the following 
relation: 
    PiiiiiSiSi bxABABbb  4/21 . 
This implies that all  are identical, and we denote its common value by : .  Using 
this notation and 
S
ib c cb
S
i 
(4), the above relation reads as  cBAcb iiPPi ,, , and the equilibrium utility 
 can be written as  tu
       





1
2
2
,,2
,,2
ii
iiii
ABtifcxtx
BAtifAttBcxtx
tu  
This proves parts (a), (b), (c), and (e) of the proposition, except for the off equilibrium action 
.  The ex-ante expected utility of S and R are as follows: OFF
    
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21
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1 . 
This proves part (d) of the proposition. 
In equilibrium, S can only burn non-negative amounts of money.  By taking 4/1c  we 
can ensure that  and .  Then, we start reducing the value of  until either 
 for some i, or  for some i for which 
0Pib
b
  0tbS
0
c
0Pib  iS B 1 ii AB .  This can always be done as 
 is an additive constant in  and c Pib  tbS .  This defines  Αc : 
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         icxBBAicBAccc iiiiiP   for  02 AND for  0,,:min 1Α . 
For any  Αcc  , some types would have need to burn negative amount of money, which is 
not feasible.  At  Αcc  , there is a type  that burns no money, and for 0t  Αcc   all types 
burn.  By the construction of  Αc , the equilibrium OFFc ,,Α  with  Αcc   and 
 always exists.  Finally, we define 0t
OFF   Αc  as the highest value of c  for which we can 
still find  that support WPBE  1,0OFF  OFFc ,,Α .  By construction,    ΑΑ cc  .  
This completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Let us fix a WPBE   with partition  Α  in which  for some i  so that all types 
 burn b  in equilibrium.  We will show that there is another 
equilibrium 
ii BA 1
 1,  ii ABt   tS 02  cxt
~  (we use the tilde sign ‘~’ to denote all its variables) that generates a 
higher level of utility, i.e., that     SS ~ VV , so that   is non-optimal. 
Let us take an  ii BAx  1,4min,0 , and consider the equilibrium with partition 
     iB ,  iB~ ΑΑ , which only differs from  Α  in that types   ii BBt ,  pool 
together.  In ,    02  cxBB iib  so that types  and S iB iB  get utilities 
  cxBxBu ii  22  and     cBxxBu ii   22 . 
In ~ , types   ii BBt ,  burn    cBBctb iiPS ,,~  : 
      04/424/2,, 2   xcxBcxBcBBc iiiiP , 
so that the constraint  is not violated in  0,,  cBBc iiP   ~ .  Types   ii BBt ,  get 
utilities: 
       22~ 2 tBBBBtcxtxtu iiii   . 
This implies that the marginal types  and iB iB  get 
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   iii BucxBxBu   22~  and         iii BucBxxBu 22 ~ , 
i.e., the same utilities as they get in  .  Thus, all equilibrium conditions for ~  are satisfied.  
However, in WPBE ~ , the objective function  ~SV  given by (5) has one extra term, namely 
 that corresponds to an extra pooling interval 6/3  ii BB , , as compared to WPBE  .  
Thus,     6/~ 3SS  VV   and, therefore,   is not optimal Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
Let us take any WPBE  , which partition      ,,1, iBA iiΑ  has infinitely 
countable number of intervals (we use the notation  for such a partition because the 
existence of  or  is not guaranteed for every  as the index set I  can be any ordered 
set).  The set of marginal types    has at least one accumulation point, and we take any of 
them and denote by .  It follows that for any 
iB
1iA 1iA
Aˆ
iA
IiiA
0 , there are infinitely many marginal types 
either in its right neighborhood  AA ˆ,ˆ  or left neighborhood  Aˆ,Aˆ  .  We consider the 
first possibility; the other case is treated similarly. 
Let us take an  x4,0   and choose two marginal types  and  such that 
1n
A
2n
A 21 nn   
and .  In , marginal type  burns Aˆ AAA nnˆ 21  iA  Ai  cxAb iS 2 .  By continuity of 
, type  gets utility  t Aˆu
    cxAxAuAu
kik
 
 ˆ2limˆ 2 , 
where the limit is taken over any decreasing subsequence of  
ki
A  that converges to Aˆ .  By 
construction, type  gets the same utility if he perfectly reveals his type, in which case he 
burns 
Aˆ
  0ˆ2ˆ  AxAbS  c .  In , S gets the following utility :   SS VV
       








 





 2
2
1
1
3
1
3
ˆ
3
ˆ
32S
6
1
ni
ni
ni
ni
ii AA
ii
AA
AA
ii
AA
AA
ii
AA
ii ABABABABxxcV . 
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Let us now consider WPBE ~  such that in the underlying partition  ~Α , all types 
 
2
,ˆ nAAt  pool together and all other types follow the same strategies as in  .  In ~ , S gets: 
            22 33ˆ 32SS ˆ61~~ nii AA iinAA ii ABAAABxxcVV . 
This implies: 
     
           0ˆˆ
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In ~ , types  
2
,ˆ nAAt  burn: 
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Thus, all equilibrium conditions for ~  are satisfied, and   is suboptimal due to 
    0~ SS  VV .  This ends the proof.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3. 
Let us fix a WPBE   in which the Sender burns money in some two intervals and does not 
burn in between them.  We denote the index of the second such interval by , , 
and the number of intervals in between by , 
k Nk ,,2
n 2,,0  kn  .  In other words, we assume that 
0Pkc ,  and  for 01 P nkc 0Pic    1,,  knki  . 
We will show that there is another equilibrium ~  such that     0~ SS  VV .  In particular, 
we consider a family of equilibria which have the same value of the parameter , and the 
same marginal types in the set  
c
 ,0 1 nk AA
 
1,1k .  It is easy to see that the choice of  
uniquely defines  for 
kA
iA  1,,  ki kn   through   0,, 1  cAA iiP ccPi  as follows: 
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 xcxAxAA iii   121 22 . 
By induction on i , this recursive equation implies:5 
  jxcAsjAA kkjk  ,2  for nj ,,1 , (13) 
where 
  cxAxcAs  2, 2 . 
Therefore, the lengths of the intervals, which we denote by 
iii AAD  1 , 
can be written as follows: 
     012,21   xjcAsAAD kjkjkjk  for nj ,,1 . 
The constraints   0,, 1  cAAc iiP  imply that: 
     jkjkjkjkjkjkjk AAcAAxAAD   1221313 44  for . (14) nj ,,1
In this notation,  can be written as the following function of : SV kA
  


  
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i
ik DDDDDxxcAVV
1
33
1
33
1
2
1
32SS
6
1ˆ . 
It can be shown that  is convex so that it does not have an interior maximum, and its 
maximum necessarily violates one of the restrictions , , , or 
.  Consequently, in any open neighborhood of , there exists an 
 kAV Sˆ 
01 nkD
kA
0kD
A
0Pkc
01 P nkc k~  so that the 
corresponding WPBE ~  is such that     0~ SS  VV , which ends the proof. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 4. 
It is easy to see that if  so that 1N     1,0A , and , 01 Pc   is not optimal.  Indeed, 
by reducing the value of , we get the same completely pooling WPBE in which less money c
                                                                          
  02, 5  The necessary condition for the induction is that  nxcAs jkA 
nj ,,1 0Pi
   1,,  knki 
.  When it fails,  does not exist 
for some .  Hence, this condition is necessarily satisfied by the assumption that c  for 
. 
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is burned.  In the rest of the proof, we assume that .  The proof consists of two parts.  
First, we show that 
2N
  is not optimal if .  Second, we show that neither is   optimal if 
 for . 
01 Pc
0Pic
c
 N,
0
N /2

i ,3
1 Pc
0Pic
 A 1
 
Part 1.  Let  in .  Then, in accordance with  Lemma 3,  for all .  
Constraints  define  and  as functions of  through 
0Pic  N,,2i
c iA NA (13): 
   xAA NN  14 , 
    xiN AiA N NAi N  211  1  for  N,i ,2 . (15) 
Then, (14) implies that 
    22232  2 xx 
2
3
1 146
1
6
1 AAxAcDxA
N
i

  

3Di 
2xSV 14ccN  , 
and its derivative 
               
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N
AxAANAN
N
21
1
312483 222
2
2
S
 xAN1 AN16
1 ANdA
dV . 
It can be shown that .  Hence, 0/S NdAdV  NASV  strictly increases in  and, therefore, 
 is not optimal.  This ends the proof of part 1. 
NA

Part 2.  Let  for some 01 Pkc  ,2 1, Nk  in  .  Then, in accordance with Lemma 3, 
 for , which defines  and  for  ,1  c iA  1,0Pic i k, ,2 i  k  as functions of : 2A
2 , and     221 AiAi22 4/ xAA c 2ix   . 
Next, we formally define  by 2ˆ kA  , cAcP ˆ, 21  Akk : 0
  22 1 Ak  2kx
kA


Aˆk . 
We will show that .  To this end, we observe that the function  is the 
second-degree concave polynomial w.r.t. 
22
ˆ  kA  BA, ccP ,
B .  In addition, 
      04/12142,, 2222111   AxAkkkxcxAcAAc kkkP , 
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since , and also 2k   0,ˆ, 21  cAAc kkP  by construction.  Therefore, the assumed in part 2 
inequality   0,, 21  cAkk1  AcPPkc  can only be satisfied for . 22 ˆ   kk AA
The contribution of intervals  1, kk AA  and  21,  kk AA  into the objective  SV  is 
.  We will show that there is another equilibrium     6/6/ 31231   kkkk AAAA ~  which 
generates a higher level of .  In particular, we consider the equilibrium with the same 
marginal types as in  except for 
SV
 1~ kA .  In ~ , we take 1~ kA  by   0,,~ 21  cAAc kkP : 
 xcxAxAA kkk   2221 22~ . 
The following properties of 1
~
kA  can be shown.  First, that  11 , ~   kkk AAA  and 
  0,~,~ 1   cAAcc kkPPk  so that ~  is based on a legitimate partition.  Second, the contribution 
of intervals  1~,kA kA  and  21,~  kk AA  into the objective S~V  is 
    6/~6/~ 31kA231   kkk AAA .  Hence, 
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so that 0~ SS VV .  Thus,  is suboptimal, which ends the proof of part 2. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
In what follows, we assume  and define 3CTN
 22/1ˆ NxN  , 
so that .  For given  NNN xxx ,ˆ 1  x , x [ ), the most informative cheap talk 
equilibrium  has underlying partition 
CTCT NN xx ,1
CT   CTii NiAA ,,1, 1  A  with  intervals of 
positive lengths. 
CTN
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Suppose that WPBE   is the Sender’s optimal equilibrium, contains  intervals, and 
its first marginal type is .  Using  for 
N
 1,02 A 01  PiP cc Ni ,,3 , we write the parameter 
 and the other marginal types  as follows: c iA
  2222 4
1 xAAAc  , and         xiNAsiNAAi 1121 22  , 
where 
    xAxcxxAs 822 222122  . 
The last two necessary condition for   are   223 AAA   and .  It can be 
shown that these two inequalities lead to the following restriction on : 
  0,, 322  cAAcc PP
2A
      2212 1222 AxxNAxxNA NN   . (16) 
Since ,  requires  and, hence, .  Thus, 
optimal equilibrium  might only have  intervals at most, and we construct it as 
follows.  First, we fix any .  Then, we consider any  such that it 
satisfies 
CTNxx    021  AxxN
S
,1N 
CTNN xx 1
1CT
1 CTNN
 1,02 A
N
1, CTN
(16).  Third, we choose  1,02 A  such that  2AV S  is maximized: 
   
      .
4
121214
6
1
6
1
223
2
3
3
23
3
2
2
1
3
1
2
2


 

 
 


AxAAAxAAAxx
AAxxcAV
N
i
ii
S
 
If it happens at the corner 22 AA   (the other corner 12 A  corresponds to the pooling WPBE 
and never occurs when ), the resulting WPBE is the cheap talk equilibrium with 2CTN N  
interval.  Obviously,  maximizes  across all CTNN SV N .  If, on the other hand, there is an 
interior maximum  222 , AAS A , it implies that    22 VAS  ASSV .  In other words, there is a 
WPBE  that yields a higher utility to the sender than the cheap talk equilibrium with S N  
intervals.  In this case, the derivative of  2ASV , which we denote by , vanishes:  2AG 
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         23232222323232 24323461 dAdAAAxAAAxAAxAAdAdVG
S
, 
where 
    
s
AxNA
dA
dA
2
22 2
2
2
3  . 
Since x [ ), there can be two cases, CTCT NN xx ,1 x [ ) and CTCT NN xx ,ˆ x [ ), which 
we consider separately. 
CTCT NN xx ˆ,1
Part 1.  Let x [ ).  Suppose, first, .  In this case, CTCT NN xx ,ˆ 41 CTNN x [ ), 
 and, therefore, 
11,ˆ  NN xx
NN xxx  1ˆ 02 A  so that  must satisfy 2A 2A [ 2,0 A ).  It can be shown 
that  for all [ 2AG 0 2A 2,0 A ).  Hence,  2AV S  monotonically increases and has no 
maximum. 
Suppose now that .  In this case, 3 CTNN x [ ) and  must satisfy 
[
NN xx ,ˆ 2A
2A 22 , AA ).  It can be shown that    22 0 AGAG   at Nxx   and  2 A 0G  at Nxx ˆ .  
By continuity, this implies that there exists a  NxNN xy ,ˆ  such that    22  0 AGAG   for 
all x ( NN xy , ].  This implies, in turn, that there exists  22 , AA2AS   that is a local maximum 
of , and at which .  Next, it can be shown  2A V S 02 Pc  2A 0c  implies   02 AG  for 
x [ ).  Thus, when Nx,Nxˆ  22 , AA2AS  , it is necessarily the case that .  When the 
maximum is at the corner 
 2  0Ac
22A  A , it is the cheap talk most informative equilibrium with 
 intervals with CTNN 
             01111 122   xxxxNxxNxNxNAc NNNN . 
Finally, suppose that .  In this case, 1 CTNN 1 Nxx .  It can be shown that 
 for all [  02 AG 2A 22 , AA ).  Hence,  2AV S  monotonically decrease and achieves its 
maximum at 2A2A  , the cheap talk equilibrium with  intervals. CTNN 
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Summarizing Part 1, if x ( CTCT NN xy , ], the maximum is in the interior,  222 , AAAS  , 
the number of intervals is , and CTN N   02 Ac .  If, on the other hand, x [ CTCT NN yx ,ˆ ) the 
maximum is at the corner, 22A  A , it is the cheap talk equilibrium with  intervals 
and . 
CTNN
  02 Ac
Part 2.  Let x [ ).  Suppose, first, .  In this case, CTCT NN xx ˆ,1 41 CTNN x [ ), 
 and, therefore, 
1ˆ, NN xx
Nxx  02 A  so that  must satisfy 2A 2A [ 2,0 A ).  It can be shown that 
   20 AG0G   at  and Nxx   02AG  at 1ˆ  Nxx .  By continuity, this implies that there 
exists a  ˆ, NNN xxy 1  such that    20 0 GG A  for all x [ NN yx , ).  This implies, in turn, 
that there exists  22 ,0 AA  that is a local maximum of  2ASV , and at which .  
Finally, since 
02 Pc
 22 ,0 AA  ,   0x24 x2 A xN N  implies   02 Ac .  The maximum at the 
corner 22 AA   is not feasible. 
Suppose now that .  In this case, CTNN  Nxx ˆ .  It can be shown that  for all 
[
  02 AG
2A 2,0 A ).  Hence,  monotonically decrease and achieves its maximum at  2AV S 22A A , 
the cheap talk equilibrium with  intervals.  Consequently, optimal equilibrium has 
, and , as is shown in Part 1. 
CTNN 
CTNN   2Ac 0
Summarizing Part 2, if x [ 11,  CTCT NN yx ), the maximum is in the interior, 
 222 , AAAS  , the number of intervals is , and 1 CTNN   02 Ac .  If, on the other hand, 
x ( CTCT NN xy ˆ,1 ) the maximum is at the corner, 22 AA  , it is the cheap talk equilibrium with 
 intervals and . CTNN    02 Ac
Combining the above cases yield the proof of parts (a) and (b) of the proposition, and that 
 in the optimal equilibrium.  In order to prove part (  02 Ac 0OFFc) we set  and note that 
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  02 Ac 0t
 22/Ax    2xtOFF 
 implies that type  prefers sending his equilibrium message and getting utility 
 to sending any off equilibrium message and getting u :  tu  2
      0
4
1
22 xA22  AcA  tut
0t
uOFF . 
All other types , by construction of WPBE, prefer off equilibrium messages even less.  
Hence, off equilibrium path beliefs with the resulting action  support the optimal 
equilibrium of the Sender as Weak Perfect.  This proves part (
0OFF
c) of the proposition. Q.E.D. 
Remark.  Proposition 2 provides the sufficient condition for .  In order to show that it 
is also the necessary condition it is sufficient to show that the function  is quasi-
concave for all feasible values of .  The function 
02 Pc
 2AV S
2A  2AV S  has nice analytical properties, and 
numerical computations show that it is indeed the case.  This suggests that for x [
NN
yy , ] 
and for 4yx  , the sufficient condition for burning money, Proposition 2, is also the necessary 
condition, implying that   for all CTS  x [
N
y,Ny ].  We do not pursue the aim to prove 
this claim here. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Let  have a separating interval Α    Α1, ii AB .  If a type  1,  ii ABt  signals as if it were 
of type , he gets utility  1,  ii AB y      yby StWytuS  ,, .  Since  is a WPBE,   ytuS ,  
attains its maximum at .  The first-order condition  at  yields t
S
i, .

y  yuS /0 y  t
 S tb  t
B
a bdyyyW
i
   
Hence, types  get the following utility  in  1,  ii ABt u  : 
        Si
t
B
a
S bdyyyWttWttWttu
i
  ,,,, . S tb u   
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Let us construct a WPBE ~  which only differs from  by that types 
   111 ,,   iiii ABAAt   pool, i.e.,       11 ,~~   ii AA ΑΑ , and type  1iAt  
burns the same amount as in  , i.e.,       1~1 ii AbAb .  Expected type and, hence, 
optimal action  a t for  11 iA , A i  is: 
         1111 /, 11 iiii AAAAii dFtdFAAttEa  . 
Types  11 ,   ii AAt   get utilities        PP batWttu  ,,~  where  is the amount of 
money burned in interval 
 Pb
 1 , i AA 1i  in ~ .  Byconstruction, it must be that    uttu P ,~  at 
1 iAt , which determines  Pb : 
         SiAB aiiiP bdyyyWAAWaAWb ii      1 ,,, 111 . 
Therefore, types  11 ,   ii AAt   get utility  ttu P ,~ . 
            SiAB aiiiP bdyyyWAAWaAWatWttu ii      1 ,,,,,~ 111 . 
Type 1 iAt  gets utility    111~ ,~   iiPi AAuAu  in ~  whereas it gets  
in  .  We consider the cases 
   111 ,   iiSi AAuAu 
   11~   ii AuAu  and    11~   ii AuAu  separately. 
a) Let 1  1~   ii AuAu .  In this case, when types  11 ,   ii AAt   pool, all types 
1 iAt  have to burn extra amount of money       01~1   ii AuAu   relative to 
what they burn in  . (explanation needed)  Using the properties of the function 

 a , 
i.e.,   10  iA , 5.0 , and a  0a       11 6/0  iAiAfa f , it is a routine to show that 
 0     000    and 
         


 




1
1
1
11
2
,0
i
i
i
iita
Af
AfAAAW . 
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This implies that if  at ff / 1 iAt , there is an 0  such that   0  for all 
  ,0 .  The net ex-ante expected utility gain from pooling types  1t 1 ,  ii AA   is: 
       
            iiiSiiPA
A
SP AFAAuAAudFttuttu
tuEtuEg
i
i







1,,,, 1111
~
1
1 

 
It is a routine to show that       0000  ggg , and 
      

 

f
f
F
fWFg ta 12
10 . 
at .  Thus, when 1 iAt
  f
f
F
f
f
f 

1
, 
the Sender strictly prefers WPBE ~  to WPBE  . 
b) Let 1  1~   ii AuAu .  In this case, when types  11 ,   ii AAt   pool all types  
must burn less money, which might not be feasible.  However, we may require instead 
that all types 
1 iAt
 1iAt  burn an extra amount of money   0   relative to what they 
burn in  .  In a similar fashion, it can be shown that when 
f
f
F
f
f
f  , 
the Sender strictly prefers WPBE ~  to WPBE  . 
The only special case left is   fft / .  When this happens, whether    11~   ii AuAu  or 
   11 ~   ii AuAu  is determined by higher-order derivatives.  Nevertheless, one of these 
inequalities will hold and, therefore, conditions  ffFf  Ff  1///  will hold 
due to the assumption . Q.E.D. 0f
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Proof of Proposition 4. 
The proof is done by contradiction.  Suppose that condition (9) fails for all .  This 
would imply that  
 1,0t 
  01//  Ffff  for 0t  and that  fFf /0 f /  for 
.  Since 1t ff /  is continuous, there exists a  1,0ˆt  such that  at  
and, therefore, condition 
0/ f f t tˆ
(9) must hold at , the desired contradiction. Q.E.D. tt ˆ
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Inequalities which proofs are omitted in the main text. 
1. Proof of Lemma 3. 
Show that  is convex, where  kAV Sˆ
  


  




N
ki
ik
n
j
jknk
nk
i
ik DDDDDxxcAV
1
33
1
33
1
2
1
32S
6
1ˆ . 
We compute the first and the second-order derivatives:  
    
  ,348483
6
1
44
6
1
6
1
6
1ˆ
22
1
3223
1
3
1
33
1
0
1
3
2
1
3
S
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
 

 










kk
k
nk
nknk
knkknkknk
k
k
n
j
jknk
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N
ki
i
nk
i
i
kk
DcxA
dA
dAcxAD
DAAcAAxD
dA
d
DDD
dA
dDD
dA
d
dA
Vd
  
 
and 
  .2418
6
1
2
1ˆ
2
22
2
2
2
1
2
12
S2















 










k
nk
nk
k
nk
k
k
nk
nk
k
nk
nk
k
dA
AdcxA
dA
dAx
D
dA
AdD
dA
dAD
dA
Vd
 (17) 
Evaluating  and  yields: knk dAdA /
22 / knk dAAd 
 
 cAs
xn
dA
cAdsn
dA
dA
kk
k
k
nk
,
21,21  , and  
 
  0,
2,
,
2
3
2
22
2

cAs
nx
dA
cAds
cAs
xn
dA
Ad
kk
k
kk
nk . 
Hence, the first bracket in (17) is strictly positive, so that: 
 
     
 
    
  .,3
14,34
,3
2,,44
2418
6
1ˆ
3
2222
3
2
2
22
2
S2
cAs
xncAsnx
cAs
cxAxncAscAsnx
dA
AdcxA
dA
dAx
dA
Vd
k
k
k
nkkk
k
nk
nk
k
nk
k

















 
Finally,  implies 0nkD    xncAs k 12,  , which yields: 
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           0,3 1211614123,3 4ˆ 3
4
22
3
4
2
S2

cAs
nnnxnn
cAs
nx
dA
Vd
kkk
. 
Hence,  is strictly convex.  kAV Sˆ 
2. Proof of Lemma 4, part 1. 
Show that , where 0/S NdAdV
              

 
 xA
N
AxAAxAANA
dA
dV
NNNN
N
21
1
31214183
6
1 22
2
2
2
S
. 
Using (15), we express  it in terms of : NA 2A
   
 
 1
222
1
2

 N
NxN
N
AAN . 
Then, we express  it in terms of : NdAdV /
S
2A
    
    


 
 NNxx
N
NNAAN
dA
dV
N
2232
1
213
6
1
2
22
S
. 
Next, we define Aˆ  by   0,,ˆ 2 cAAcP : 
        

 
 x
N
ANxNANA N 21
111211ˆ 2 . 
Since (4) implies , and   02//  ABxAcP   0,,0 21  cAcc PP  by our assumption, it 
must be that , which is equivalent to: 0ˆ A
    11/12 2  NNANx . 
Hence, 
      
   
  01
2121
1
123223 22 


 

N
NANN
N
NANNNx , 
and, therefore, .  This ends the proof of part 1. 0/S NdAdV
3. Proof of Lemma 4, part 2. 
Show that  11 ,~   kkk AAA  and   0,~,~ 1   cAAcc kkPPk , where 
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 xcxAxAA kkk   2221 22~ . 
We fix the value of , define 1kA 012   kk AAv , and formally consider  as a function 
of v , i.e., .  Similarly, we consider functions 
2kA
  vvAk 2 Ak 1
      xcvxAxvAvA kkk   2221 22~  and 
        xcvxAxvAvAvD kkkk   22121 22~~ . 
First,   kk AA  0~ 1  since   0,, 1  cAAc kkP .  Then,   1121 ˆ~   kkkk AAAA  since 
  0,ˆ, 2  cAk1Ac kP .  Finally,   21 40~ AkxDk  .  The derivatives are 
xD
xD
cxAx
x
dv
Ad
k
k
k
k
2~
2~
2
21
~
1
1
2
2
1

 


 , and 
0
2~
4~1
~
1
11  

xD
x
dv
Ad
dv
Dd
k
kk . 
For , this implies that 2k   xDk 20~ 1  , and consequently xDk 2~ 1  , 0/~ 1  dvAd k , and 
finally  11 , ~  kk AAkA .  Hence,   0,~,~ 1  cAkk Acc PPk  and ~  is indeed WPBE. 
4. Proof of Proposition 2, definitions of 2A  and 2A . 
Show that  and   223 AAA    0,, 322  cAAcc PP  together imply 222 AAA  . 
We define  by 2
~A   0,,~ 32 cAAcP .  Since   0/,,  AcBAcP  holds,  
requires 
  0,, 32 cAAcP
22
~AA  .  Hence, we have 
   2223 ~ AAAAA  , 
where         xNAsNAA 1121 ~ 22  .  Then, we proceed: 
      
      



xNAsNA
AxNAsN
1121
2221
22
22 , 
      
      



22
22
1112
2221
AxNAsN
xNAsNA
, 
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and, finally, 
         xNN
AAsxN
N
A 1
12
12
22
1 2
2
2 

  
Using 
    xAxAs 82
2
1 2
22  , 
we continue: 
 
       
        






22
22
2
22
2
2
2
22
22
2
2
1414
1
182
822414
2
1
xNAx
N
AxAx
xAxxNAx
N
A
 
It is routine to show that the above system can be written as follows: 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 





 













0121
2
2121
0
1
2121
3
3221
22
22
N
xNNA
N
xNNA
N
xNNA
N
xNNA
, 
or 
       
      





01212
02222
212
1222
xxNAxxNA
xxNAxxNA
NN
NN   
Here we consider 4 cases by assigning different signs to all four multipliers. 
Consider 4 cases: 
Case 1. 
   
   
   
   









012
012
022
022
2
12
12
22
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
, 
which reduces to 
  
  


 
22
212
12
22
AxxNA
AxxNA
N
N , 
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as desired.  Now we will show that the other three cases can never realize. 
Case 2. 
   
   
   
   









012
012
022
022
2
12
12
22
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
, 
  
 
 
  









xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
12
12
22
22
2
12
12
22 
 , 
from which it follows that      12 1222   NN xxNxxN , and, finally, 
       0322
121 21   NNxNxNx NN . 
This case can never happen. 
Case 3. 
   
   
   
   









012
012
022
022
2
12
12
22
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
, 
from which it follows that 
  
 





12
12
12
22
N
N
xxNA
xxNA
 , 
and, finally, 






0
0
1
1
N
N
xx
xx
. 
This case can never happen. 
Case 4. 
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   
   
   
   









012
012
022
022
2
12
12
22
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
, 
  
 
 
  









xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
xxNA
N
N
N
N
12
12
22
22
2
12
12
22 
 , 
from which it follows that      xxNxxN NN   1222 1 , and, finally, 
      012
121 1   NNxNxNx NN , 
This case can never happen. 
Thus,  and  imply   223 AAA    0,, 322  cAAcc PP 222 AAA  . 
5. Proof of Proposition 2, Part1, inequality   02 A  (done numerically). G
Show that  for all [  02 AG 2A 2,0 A ), and x [ ), where 11,ˆ  NN xx
             223232222323232 24323461 AdAdAAAxAAAxAAxAAAG  
Analytical pre-requisites: 
      xNNxxNA N 221
122 12    
      0ˆ122222 112   NN xxNxxNxAx  
         12 118282 222122212  NxNxAxxAxAs  
            xNNxNAsNAA 221
12221 223   
           xNNxN
xNN
s
AxNA
dA
dA 21
112
221
2
22
2
2
2
2
3  
  
6. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 1, inequality    22 0 AGAG  . 
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Show that    22 0 AGAG   at Nxx  . 
At 22 AA  : 
 
        
       
        
       
              ,12 22
12
1
12
2
22
1
222
1
1
12
12
12
11
1
222
1
1
1
222
1
122
12
1
2
2
2
3
223
2
223
12




 







N
N
s
xN
N
N
s
AxNA
dA
dA
NN
AxN
N
AA
NN
N
N
xNAs
NN
AxN
N
AA
NN
xN
N
xxNA
NN
xx
N
N
 
         
 
       
      
   .01422312
12116
1
2
1
142
1
1421
6
1
2441
6
1
243234
6
1
2
3
2
2
2
3
22
2
3
23
2
2
2
2323232


 



 





 



 


 



 
N
NNNN
NNNN
x
NdA
dAxN
N
xNA
xA
dA
dAxAxA
dA
dAAAxAAAxAAxAAAG
 
At 22 AA  : 
 
  
    
   
    
 12
2
2
22
1
2
12
122120
012
12
1
2
2
3
23
2
2







N
N
s
AxN
dA
dA
NN
AA
NN
N
x
xxxs
xxNA
NN
xx
N
N
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     
      
   
   
    .01216
9524
1216
12884121
83234
6
10
2222
2
3
3333






 
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNNNN
dA
dAxAAxAxAG
 
Thus,    22 0 AGAG   at . Nxx 
7. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 1, inequality   02 AG . 
Show that   02 AG  at . Nxx ˆ
At 22 AA  : 
 
  
 
      
  
      04234
6
1
0
2
22
42221
1
112
12
1
2
1ˆ
423232
2
2
3
223
2
22
2







N
xAAxAAAG
s
AxN
dA
dA
N
xNsNAA
N
As
N
xxNA
NN
x
N
xx
N
N
N
 
Thus,   02 AG  at . Nxx ˆ
8. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 1, inequality   02 A  (done numerically). G
Show that  when ,   02 AG   02 Ac x [ ), and NN xx ,ˆ 2A [ 22 , AA ). 
9. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 1, inequality   02 A  (done numerically). G
Show that  for all [  02 AG 2A 22 , AA ) and 1 Nxx . 
10. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 2, inequality    200 AGG  . 
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Show that    200 AGG   at Nxx  .  The proof is exactly the same as the proof of 
   22 0 AGAG   at  above. Nxx 
11. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 2, inequality   02 AG . 
Show that   02 AG  at . 1ˆ  Nxx
 
    
     
        
    
        
      012
1234
6
1
243234
6
1
0
2
22
1
12221
1
182
1
122
12
1ˆ
42323
2
3
23
2
2
2
2323232
2
2
2
3
223
2
22
1
2
212
21




 







N
xAAxAA
dA
dAAAxAAAxAAxAAAG
s
AxNA
dA
dA
N
xNsNAA
N
xAxAs
N
xxNA
N
xx
N
N
 
12. Proof of Proposition 2, Part 2, inequality   02 A  (done numerically). G
Show that  for [  02 AG 2A 2,0 A ) and Nxx ˆ . 
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